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THE PERILS OF GLOBALIZATION AND 
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 
Professor John H. Jackson * 
INTRODUCTION 
The post-World War II world trading system is now more 
than fifty years old, and not surprisingly, it has evolved through a 
number of different stages of development and survived a series 
of perils. Recently, however, the perils seem even greater than 
before. The failure of the Seattle Ministerial Meeting of Novem-
ber-December 1999 focused the attention of the international 
community, almost like a prospective execution focusing the at-
tention of the targeted person. A number of different factors 
have contributed to this perilous situation, and in this brief Es-
say, I want to look particularly at some of the institutional char-
acteristics of the World Trade Organization1 ("WTO"), which 
may be contributing to, or inhibiting escape from, the "perils." I 
will do this in four parts. 
Part I will be a brief reminder of the policy objectives and 
implications of the international economic system. Part II will 
overview the world trading system's need for a cooperative inter-
national mechanism or institution. Part III will examine the 
characteristics needed for a successful institution of this type, 
which might be the WTO. Part IV will explore some problems 
connected with the current situation related to the needed char-
acteristics. 
1. THE POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
When analyzing the successes and failures of the current 
world trading system, it is useful to begin by recalling the as-
sumptions of the policymakers that form the foundation for this 
* This Essay develops some thinking expressed in a lecture and essay. See John H. 
Jackson, The wro 'Constitution' and Proposed Reforms: The Seven 'Mantras'Revisited, PSIO 
OCCASIONAL PAPER, WTO SERIES No. 02 (2000); John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and 
the wro: Emerging Problems,]. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 1998, at 329-51; John H. Jackson, Inter-
national Economic Law in Times that are Interesting,]. INT'L ECON. L. 3, Mar. 2000, at 3-14. 
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement]. 
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system.2 There were two main objectives sought at the Bretton 
Woods Conference in 1944 and at the subsequent conferences 
that led to the negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade3 ("GATT") and the International Trade Organization 
("ITO"). The first objective, the more important one at that 
time, sometimes overlooked, was the prevention of another war. 
The idea was to build institutions that would avoid the problems 
that occurred in the inter-war period, which were blamed for 
leading to the Second World War. Arguably, this post-World 
War II vision of the statesmen establishing a world trading sys-
tem has proven successful, in that the world has since avoided a 
global war. 
The second objective was the economic betterment of the 
whole world. This is based on general policies about economics 
and the market structure of economies. The basic idea is that 
increasing the amount of resources for each individual (or fam-
ily) is the best way to allow that individual to follow his or her 
choices, lifestyle, and goals in life. This objective is based on the 
economics of comparative advantage and the economics of com-
petition. The economists themselves have articulated certain 
challenges to the concepts of comparative advantage. However, 
even those who reject some or all of the concepts of comparative 
advantage may accept the advantages of competition: namely, a 
higher degree of efficiency and productivity that contribute to 
world economic betterment. We should note that competition 
occurs between producers or service providers within single 
countries or across borders. 
Today, the world trading system is motivated by a third ob-
jective: managing economic interdependence, what some peo-
ple call "globalization." Natural barriers to cross-border eco-
nomic activities have declined dramatically due to the events of 
the last several decades. Half a century ago, countries were moti-
vated to reduce border barriers and other barriers to trade. 
2. See also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND POLICY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997). A bibliography of principal publica-
tions of this author may be found at the Georgetown University Law Center web site. 
See also a compilation of a number of relevant articles by this author at JOHN H. JACK-
SON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GAlT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAw AND 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2000). 
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1I, TJ.A.S. 
1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GAlTJ. 
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However, border barriers may not have been as vital or signifi-
cant at that time, since there were other, more natural barriers 
to trade. During these last decades, those natural trade barriers 
have declined in significance. First, transportation costs and time 
have been significantly reduced. As a result, farmers can ship 
fresh produce to locations halfway around the world. Second, 
communication has improved, thereby reducing what might 
have been a natural trade barrier. Third, transaction costs and 
time have been significantly reduced in the last five to ten years. 
These changes challenge us, and we can reevaluate the ad-
vantages that we hope to gain from comparative advantage and 
competition. The reduction of natural trade barriers should en-
hance these advantages. Nevertheless, we know, and the econo-
mists instruct us, that there are both winners and losers in this 
process. Decades ago, the basic concept was that the advantages 
create a rising tide that lifts all boats. We now realize that not all 
boats are lifted, for one reason or another. This results in a situ-
ation in which people experience fear and anxiety about 
whether they will be able to retain their living standard and lifes-
tyle. Even people who have profited handsomely by these new 
economic developments have felt this in some cases. Poignant is 
the person about fifty-five or sixty years of age who loses a job 
and is in a position where it is very difficult to find another job 
within a reasonable period of time, and yet is not then able to 
retire. These are some of the facets that contribute to the crea-
tion of so-called "globalphobia," which has been written about 
and was manifested in Seattle in late 1999. 
II. THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM'S NEED FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
Looking at the landscape of the world trading system, what 
are the implications of these circumstances? As the countries of 
the world become increasingly interdependent, nation-state gov-
ernments cannot regulate effectively on many subjects. As a re-
sult, national governments cannot meet the expectations of their 
constituents and cannot deliver upon their promises to their 
constituents. This imposes a considerable amount of tension on 
governments and makes governing much more difficult. Within 
this context, there is a worry that there will be a "race to the 
bottom" and that there will be a tendency for governments to 
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redress their insecurity by using barriers of one type or another. 
For example, it leads to what some economists analyze as the 
prisoners'dilemma: when one country raises barriers, another is 
likely to do so, and soon all countries will be hurt. What is the 
solution? 
The solution is cooperative institutions at the international 
level. These institutions should be based on rule orientation, as 
opposed to power orientation. These rules should be well for-
mulated and effective. In other words, they should cause certain 
kinds of behavior and inhibit other kinds of behavior. 
This raises the issue of sovereignty. We are seeing that the 
rule-oriented measures that emerged from the Uruguay Round4 
and earlier rounds of multilateral trade negotiations deeply af-
fect national regulation internally, not merely at the border. As 
a result, some people in the United States have argued that we 
should reverse course and take the WTO back to the time when 
it was responsible only for border measures, thereby limiting its 
ability to affect national regulation internally. This is folly, be-
cause such time never existed. It was always recognized that 
there were measures in GATT that would have effects behind the 
border. In particular, GATT Article III, paragraph 4, which 
deals with internal regulations and national treatment,5 always 
has had enormous implications on sovereignty and sovereign de-
cisions relating to internal regulations. 
Another part of this policy landscape is the relationship of 
institutions to markets. This Essay is based in part on the under-
lying assumption of market economics, an assumption that can 
be challenged. But following the logic of market economic 
thinking, we realize that during the last several decades econo-
mists have become much more interested in the institutions that 
underpin the markets and make the markets work. These insti-
tutions are vital. The markets themselves will not work without 
an appropriate institutional framework, as implied by the writ-
ings of Nobel Prize winners Douglass North and Ronald Coase.6 
4. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 
1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
5. GATT art. III. 
6. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990); RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw (1988); 
see also JAN TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES (1985). 
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Perhaps what we saw in Seattle last December was in essence 
a challenge to the existing institutional structure. Many com-
mentators have discussed the causes of the failure of Seattle at 
great length and have come up with a list of a dozen such 
causes.7 However, my focus is on the institutional side, on what I 
call the "constitution" of the world trading system.s I am using 
the term "constitution" in the broad view, as it is used in the 
United Kingdom, representing this institutional structure as a 
whole, as the world trading system actually operates, including 
informal mechanisms and "practice." 
People have asked, "Is Seattle a real crisis?" Mter all, GATT 
and the WTO have been through various times like this, such as 
the 1982 ministerial, the Montreal mid-term ministerial in the 
Uruguay Round in 1988, and the Brussels impasse in 1990. 
Thus, it may be business as usual. In my view, however, Seattle is 
at least a mini-crisis that may serve as a wake-up call for some of 
the problems that we can see imbedded in the institutional struc-
ture. 
What did the crisis or mini-crisis mean? I do not think that 
it will lead to a collapse of the WTO. In other words, the WTO 
will not disappear in a puff of smoke. However, if the WTO fails 
to keep abreast of the changes in the world and to evolve as an 
institution, some of the major users of the institution, and partic-
ularly some of the large trading powers, may begin to turn else-
where to solve their problems. This could mean that these coun-
tries would turn to other multilateral institutions, such as the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
("OECD"), or to regional organizations, bilateral measures, or 
even unilateral measures. If the major users become disillu-
7. See, e.g., Gary Horlick, Reactions to Seattle, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 162, 167 (2000) 
(discussing factors that contributed to the failure to launch a new round at Seattle); 
joseph Kahn, Swiss FO'IUm Has Its Focus on Memoriesfrom Seallle, N.Y. TIMEs,jan. 29, 2000, 
at Cl (stating that "government officials have stressed that the failure of trade talks owes 
more to negotiating positions taken by World Trade Organization members than to the 
influence of demonstrators"); Michael Littlejohns, Embattled WTO Looks for Allies at the 
UN World Trade Body: Moore Says Public Confidence Must Be Rebuilt to Stem Threat to Eco-
nomic Globalization, FIN. TIMES, jan. 20, 2000, at 10 (quoting WTO Director-General 
Mike Moore as stating that the NGOs and anti-trade groups at Seattle contributed but 
were not the ultimate causes of the failure). 
8. See, e.g. ,jOHN H.jACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND 
JURISPRUDENCE (1998). 
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sioned, the WTO could gradually atrophy, which would then be 
disappointing to some of the other users of the system. 
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS NEEDED FOR WTO SUCCESS. 
Given the need expressed above, what are the characteris-
tics needed for a successful international cooperative institution 
(which might be the WTO)? I suggest these would include the 
following characteristics (but this list is certainly not exhaustive). 
A. Rule-Oriented System 
As indicated above, the cooperative mechanism must in-
clude a rule-oriented system with treaty rules that are reasonably 
effective. This is partly is because an international institution 
has a vague, very meager menu from which to draw governmen-
tal actions that can supply remedies to market failure. It is very 
unlikely that an international institution will have the power to 
tax, nor the wherewithal to subsidize. Likewise, its ability to rear-
range market structures (such as tradable permits) is very lim-
ited. Thus, the focus for an international institution is generally 
on its potential role as "regulating" through the use of rules. 
However, the mere formulation of the rules is certainly not 
enough. The rules must be effective, reasonably efficient to im-
plement, and creditable enough so that millions of market trad-
ers will build them into their strategic thinking about how to 
make important decisions for their businesses. 
B. Dispute Settlement Procedures 
The question begins to focus on the ability to have rules that 
will be effective, and this in turn, often boils down to a set of 
dispute settlement procedures. This is partly because the inter-
national institutions do not have the same sort of monopoly of 
power that national institutions often have and thus cannot truly 
"enforce" their rules using sanctions and force. Instead, interna-
tional institutions depend much more on the persuasive effect of 
procedures and diplomacy. Countries obey rules partly because 
they feel an obligation to do so and because they want others to 
treat them similarly, etc. But for these techniques of "enforce-
ment" to be successful, the institution and the rules must be 
creditable and deemed legitimate. 
HeinOnline -- 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 377 2000-2001
2000] GLOBALIZATION AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 377 
C. International "Regulatory" Institutions 
In today's world, the importance of the international "regu-
latory" institution is much greater, since some of its decisions will 
have a clear and perceptible impact on the economic welfare of 
millions of individuals (including entrepreneurs) around the 
world. Another way of putting this is that the "stakeholders" in 
the international system are much more plentiful and much 
more diverse than has been the case in some circumstances of 
past diplomacy. In addition, due to the ease of travel and com-
munication, the stakeholders find it much more feasible to or-
ganize their efforts to monitor and influence government deci- . 
sions. 
D. Credibility and Legitimacy 
It is important that the procedures of the institution will 
lead to the enhancement of the critically needed characteristics 
of credibility and legitimacy. Some of these characteristics that 
are called for by the significance, plentitude, and variety of stake-
holders, include transparency and participation. Often, the 
word transparency is used to include participation, but here I pre-
fer to divide those two subjects and reserve for the word trans-
parency the notion of receiving information, leaving for the word 
participation the notion of having an opportunity to make one's 
views heard by the decision-making processes. 
E. Transparency 
Modern communications techniques (e.g., the Internet and 
e-mail) have accentuated both the desire and the need for 
greater access to information for stakeholders. Citizens demand 
to have enough knowledge about how decisions are made so that 
they can judge for themselves whether the decisions are fair and 
based on appropriate and accurate factual information. They 
also wish to know almost instantly the full text and reasoning of 
decisions and what the influences on those decisions were. This 
is a critical "check and balance" on governments' misuse of 
power, but perfectly responsible government actions are also 
viewed with skepticism bymany constituencies unless there is ad-
equate information for the stakeholders to make judgements. 
In the context of the WTO, this involves two separate cate-
gories of activities: diplomacy or rule-making activities and dis-
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pute-settlement or rule-applying activities. In both respects, the 
WTO is coming under great criticism. Yet there are many gov-
ernments (probably a majority of the members) who adamantly 
oppose improvement on this characteristic of the WTO. This 
opposition could be a recipe for disaster, or at least a recipe for 
decline of the institution, since it decreases the WTO's credibil-
ity and arouses suspicion. 
It is interesting to this Observer to learn from some very 
experienced senior and now retired diplomats, their views that 
the WTO could indeed be considerably more transparent than it 
is. On the diplomacy side, some of the meetings of the WTO 
could be open to the public or at least to a press gallery. In 
some cases, even television would be appropriate. 
With respect to the dispute settlement process, there has 
been much discussion about why the proceedings at the first 
level Panel and at the Appellate Body level could not be public, 
as many national proceedings and some other international pro-
ceedings are. Sometimes a criticism against this approach is 
made on the basis of misinformation about what is proposed. 
What is not proposed is opening the deliberations of the Panels 
and the Appellate Body to the public. Instead it is proposed 
only that the proceedings of advocacy by the disputing parties, 
third parties, etc., be open for viewing. In addition, there are 
strong feelings that the submittals from the governments, and 
possibly from other sources, should be public and available quite 
rapidly. Certainly, the resulting Panel report should be made 
public rapidly, so as to prevent "insider information" enabling 
strong critics of the decisions to make their cases in public while 
inhibiting responses from responsible participants. More study 
could be devoted to some of the pros and cons of this, including 
the legitimate worry on the part of some member countries that 
transparency could cause a certain tilt in the power structure of 
the organization as a whole. 
F. Participation 
It is more and more common now that national govern-
ments and many international organizations provide a degree 
(often constrained and limited, but nevertheless existing) of par-
ticipation for stakeholders to make their views known. Some-
times this can be very useful, drawing attention to arguments or 
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even specific data that might otherwise not be readily available 
or within the resources of governments to collect for the dispute 
settlement proceedings. Again, the participation can be ex-
amined in connection with the diplomacy and rule-making pro-
cess (but designed so as to avoid interference with the negotiat-
ing delicacies) on the one hand, and on the other hand, the 
dispute settlement process could utilize an "amicus brief' ap-
proach with appropriate constraints and rules to encourage par-
ticipation. 
Thus, important questions arise as to whether these charac-
teristics are being developed and enhanced in the evolution of 
the WTO. 
IV. EMERGING PROBLEMS 
Mostly (but not entirely) as a result of the "consensus rule" 
of decision-making,9 there appears to be considerable difficulty 
in the WTO decision-making processes. The world is no longer 
the same as it was even a decade or two ago, in the sense that 
economic developments (partly as a result of technology) are 
moving very fast. For the principal international organization 
for economic relations to be too often in an impasse situation is 
not healthy. Governments, entrepreneurs, and citizens are ques-
tioning whether the WTO has an effective "legislature" or "exec-
utive." If decision-making or rule-making processes are not 
working, this can have an important impact on the distribution 
of power within the organization. Currently we seem to have a 
very effective and relatively efficient judicial process (the dispute 
settlement process). It is certainly more effective than it was 
prior to the WTO. It has received a lot of credit, and, although 
it is not without some problems, it has been very worthwhile. 
However, if the decision-making or rule-making processes 
fail to produce results, there is a tendency to throw issues at the 
dispute settlement system. Therefore, there could be a tendency 
to ask the dispute settlement process to take on issues that it 
ought not to. For instance, there could be temptations to put in 
the hands of the dispute settlement process issues that are really 
"rule-making" instead of "rule-applying." 
There are real concerns about the current decision-making 
9. See WTO Agreement art. IX. 
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structure. This structure developed in the Uruguay Round ne-
gotiations, when negotiations focused on a world trade organiza-
tion, particularly in the fall of 1993 when major players worked 
hard to alter some of the previous drafts. While alterations were 
appropriate in many ways, one of the things that the negotiators 
did was to constrain and put checks and balances on the deci-
sion-making process. They did this by requiring decision by con-
sensus, super-majorities, and other kinds of procedures. Today 
we realize that those constraints can lead to a lack of effective-
ness of the decision-making process. This is one of the issues 
and one of the dilemmas that we have before us that requires 
more examination. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to a consensus-
based decision-making process. One downside of requiring full 
consensus is that it may be a recipe for impasse, stalemate, and 
paralysis. In other words, the result may be that things do not 
get done. We have seen some very interesting examples of that 
in the last year. There are also examples that often are not easily 
visible. 
There are situations, for example, where the participants in 
this constitution would like to see evolution and change. These 
changes may be rather detailed and technical, such as modifying 
procedural elements of the Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes iO ("DSU"). Yet, pro-
ponents of change may abandon such an effort even before try-
ing, because of their perception that the consensus process 
makes it impossible to do what they want to do. 
What are some alternate methods for decisions? One possi-
bility is to figure out a way to distinguish the more detailed pro-
cedural aspects from things that have real substance. There is 
already a distinction in the amending clause of the WTO be-
tween the non-substantive and the more substantive issues. I 1 
There might be ways to develop a similar distinction in the con-
sensus process. Of course, one of the problems with the consen-
sus process is that in order to change it you must have consensus. 
Therefore, any country can block a proposed change. This leads 
10. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
vol. I, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). 
11. See ViTO Agreement art. X. 
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us to search for alternative ways to make changes without 
amending either the DSU or the WTO as a whole. Often this is a 
delicate question, and I am not sure the alternatives are worka-
ble. If they are not workable, and the parties are without re-
course to make changes, we are likely to be in very great trouble. 
There, however, are some other possibilities. One possibil-
ity is a so-called "critical mass" idea, which has been experi-
mented with. The basic idea is to develop a practice where 
countries refrain from blocking consensus when a critical mass 
of countries supports a proposed change. This critical mass of 
countries could be expressed as an overwhelming majority of 
countries and an overwhelming amount of the trade weight in 
the world, such as ninety percent of both of these factors. In 
addition, there could be other factors. Of course, the proposed 
change would need to be consistent with the existing treaty obli-
gations, including most-favored nation 12 ("MFN"). One could 
try to develop a practice, maybe through something called "peer 
pressure," by encouraging states to refrain from blocking a con-
sensus in certain kinds of decision-making, if these other attrib-
utes existed. One parallel or analog to this approach is roughly 
(but not precisely) the so-called Luxembourg Compromise in 
the history of the European Communities development. 
Another possibility is to use expert or smaller groups at-
tached to a particular committee, such as the Dispute Settlement 
Body. Such a group would meet with diplomats and perhaps 
outside experts to draft a proposal that coincided with criteria, 
such as those mentioned above. Then, when a proposed change 
is put forward to the final decision-makers, the parties could ar-
gue that governments should refrain from blocking the consen-
sus in that particular circumstance because of the critical mass 
argument, the percentage-of-trade, and so forth. 
A third approach is to use a "tariff scheduling" approach. 
This approach was used in the telecommunications agreement13 
and, to some extent, the financial services agreement. 14 Under 
12. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, 
Annex IB, pt. II, art. II, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 
I.L.M. 1169 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
13. See Annex on Telecommunications, Apr. 15, 1994, GATS, Annex, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 28, 33 I.L.M. 1192 (1994). 
14. See Annex on Financial Services, Apr. 15, 1994, GATS, Annex, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 28, 33 I.L.M. 1189 (1994). 
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this approach, commitments resulting from further negotiations 
were put in the schedules (which are annexed to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services) and apply to those govern-
ments that were willing to go along with the measure. Of course, 
these commitments are usually subject to MFN, depending on 
some of the aspects of the Services Agreement. This approach 
addresses both the difficulties with the consensus rule and the 
"single package" idea. It IS analogous to something that was built 
into the WTO, namely, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, 15 
which are optional. 
Unfortunately, it takes a full consensus to add an agreement 
to Annex 4, so there could well be blocking against that ap-
proach. But if there were not blocking, this also might be an 
approach where certain innovation could occur with smaller 
groupings than the whole. 
CONCLUSION 
The WTO is currently our most important international in-
stitution for assisting markets, now very globalized, to work. Yet 
the flaws in the WTO, unless addressed and hopefully moder-
ated, will cause increasing damage to that institution, particu-
larly its critically important characteristics of credibility and legit-
imacy. This could result in increasing problems for the working 
of markets in our globalized world. Let us hope these trends can 
be reversed. 
15. See Plurilateral Trade Agreements, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 4, 
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm. 
